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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
 
“Religion … is a nearly ubiquitous form of human behavior, culturally established in complex 
elaborations, but absolutely useless, from a crudely technological standpoint, in the 
accomplishment of the primary economic, domestic, and political tasks of mankind” (Wallace 
1966, vi). 
 
The enormous resources devoted to religious ritual across cultures pose a challenge to 
economists committed to rational choice theories of economic behavior. One 
traditional response has been to write off religious behavior as primitive, superstitious 
and outside the realm of economic calculus. However, the universality and 
widespread revitalization of religion demands a more thoughtful response. A growing 
number of economists h ave recently proposed plausible benefits associated with 
exacting ritual practices.  
Iannaccone (1992) models religion as a club good with a positive externality 
to increased participation. An individual’s utility thus depends not only on his or her 
own inputs in religious activities, but also increases with others’ inputs. Individuals 
who are less committed to the religion’s doctrine are tempted to free ride off those 
who are more devout. Costly sacrifices and prohibitions in Iannaccone’s model serve 
to screen out free riders with the result that members’ average participation levels, and 
thus their utility levels, are higher.   
Berman (2000) extends Iannaccone’s club-good model of religion to 
understand the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox community’s need for costly sacrifices to signal 
commitment and to exclude free riders from their network of charity and mutual 
insurance. Berman shows that subsidies to club membership are largely dissipated 
since they induce even more costly sacrifices to signal group commitment. He uses 
his model to argue that the Israeli government’s subsidies to the Ultra-Orthodox 
sector has resulted in inefficient sacrifices, such as male Yeshiva attendance (and thus 
their non-participation in the labor force) until age 40 on average, well beyond that of 
Ultra-Orthodox males outside of Israel.   
Anthropologists have long noted that one of the primary functions of religion 
is to promote group solidarity, and most have recognized ritual as the mechanism 
through which this solidarity is achieved. Guided by Durkheim (1995 [1912]), who 
was among the first to appreciate the unifying nature of religious ritual, 
anthropologists have explored how ritual sustains the social order within a community   2
(e.g., Douglas 1966, Radcliffe-Brown 1952). They have argued that collective rituals 
enable the expression and reaffirmation of shared beliefs, norms, and values and are 
thus essential for maintaining communal stability and group harmony.  For Durkheim, 
collective rituals are the means by which individuals bond with one another in the 
community. He claims that the “effervescent” state of ritual performance minimizes 
individual distinctions and emphasizes the unity of the group. Turner
  (1969) also 
views this “effervescent” state as central to ritual’s efficacy. He observes that the 
temporary removal of adolescents from society during rites of passage increased a 
sense of communitas, which he characterizes as a strengthening of social bonds and 
heightened solidarity among ritual performers. 
  More recently, evolutionary researchers have extended these early 
anthropological analyses and argued that religious behaviors serve to promote 
cooperation among their performers (Cronk 1994, Irons 2001, Rappaport 1999, Sosis 
2003, Sosis and Alcorta 2003, Steadman and Palmer 1995, Wilson 2002). For 
example, Irons maintains that rituals have enhanced our ability to overcome the 
collective-action problems we have likely faced throughout our evolutionary history. 
The significant time and energetic costs incurred in the performance of ritual serve as 
signals of group commitment and loyalty and thus permit a net benefit from 
successful collective action. 
To date, there has been little empirical research demonstrating that costly 
religious rituals promote group commitment, solidarity and increased cooperation 
between group members (Kress et al. 2003, Sosis 2000, Sosis and Bressler 2003, 
Sosis and Ruffle 2003). This relationship can be readily tested in the framework of the 
Israeli kibbutz since kibbutzim (the plural of kibbutz) are divided into those that are 
religious and those that are secular. Members of the 16 religious kibbutzim are 
modern Orthodox Jews. By contrast, secular kibbutzim are known to be the most 
secular element of Israeli society. Indeed, studies of secular kibbutz members indicate 
antagonistic sentiments toward religion (see Spiro 1970 for a classic ethnography of 
the kibbutz). This distinction allows us to measure the degree of cooperation of 
kibbutz members toward fellow members as a function of whether they belong to  a 
religious or a secular kibbutz. 
To do so, we design a common-pool resource game that resembles the types of 
day-to-day problems confronted by kibbutz members. Kibbutz members play the 
game in pairs. Members of religious kibbutzim are paired with anonymous members   3
from their own kibbutz, and likewise for members of secular kibbutzim. By 
comparing the cooperative behavior of religious kibbutz members with that of secular 
kibbutz members, we put forward a clean test of the hypothesis that religious ritual 
promotes in-group cooperation in a setting in which cooperation is a matter of 
economic survival. 
Moreover, the naturally occurring variation in collective ritual performance on 
religious kibbutzim, especially along gender lines, offers an opportunity to explore 
whether differences in individual cooperativeness can be explained by variation in the 
performance of collective ritual. Collective ritual obligations fall disproportionately 
upon men in Judaism. We gather individual -level data on collective ritual 
performance and explore the relationship between the extent of ritual participation 
and cooperative behavior. Because the lives of members of secular kibbutzim are not 
structured by religious ritual (but are otherwise very similar to those of religious 
kibbutz members), they provide a natural comparative population to assess the impact 
of collective ritual performance on cooperation. 
Our results show that not all kibbutz members are equally cooperative: 
religious men (the primary practitioners of collective religious ritual in Judaism) are 
more cooperative than religious women. What is more, religious men who attend 
synagogue daily (the primary collective ritual obligation for men only) are more 
cooperative than any other group, including religious women, secular men, secular 
women and religious men who attend synagogue less frequently. In fact, religious 
men who do not attend synagogue daily are no more cooperative than religious 
women. Nonetheless, from previous research (Ruffle and Sosis 2003) in which city 
residents played the same common-pool resource game, we conclude that all of 
subgroups of kibbutz members who self-selected a communal and cooperative 
lifestyle behave more cooperatively than city residents. 
Our results are used to explain the finding that religious kibbutzim have been 
economically more successful than their secular counterparts (see, e.g., Fishman and 
Goldschmidt 1990). Moreover, the persistence of religion and religious ritual in the 
developing world in particular can be seen as mechanisms to solve frequently 
encountered collective-action problems in the absence of substitute economic, 
institutional and legal structures. 
 
   4
 
1.2  The Economic Benefits of Religious Ritual 
 
Iannaccone’s pioneering model illustrates the effectiveness of costly sacrifices in 
screening out free riders. He tests his model’s predictions using self -reported survey 
data from the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey, 1986-1990. 
The individual-level data include measures of religious observance and participation. 
He categorizes the different churches to which respondents belong according to the 
stringency of their demands. Controlling for demographic factors, Iannaccone finds 
that the stricter the church, the higher the average levels of church attendance, 
contributions and frequency of prayer. Subsequent research also supports the 
screening role of costly sacrifices in Iannaccone’s model (see, for example, 
Iannaccone 1994, Berman 2000).     
Notice that sacrifice in Iannaccone’s model provides a benefit in the 
production of religious goods.1 In this paper, we demonstrate an economic benefit 
offered by religious behavior that extends beyond the place of worship. The benefit 
upon which we focus is economic cooperation. We hypothesize that collective 
religious ritual promotes economic cooperation among the practitioners of the ritual. 
As proposed by Iannaccone, strict, demanding rituals screen out opportunistic 
members not wholly committed to the religion’s ideals. However, members willing to 
incur the cos ts of regular ritual performance are likely to vary considerably in their 
degree of ritual participation. Screening cannot account for how such individual 
variation may explain differences in members’ cooperative behavior. Costly signaling 
theory can: the extent to which an individual partakes in time-consuming collective 
religious ritual, and thus foregoes other activities, signals to members of the religion 
that individual’s degree of commitment (Irons 2001; Sosis 2003). To be effective, 
religious rituals must be performed collectively so that a member’s participation is 
publicly observable.
2 The anthropological literature on the functionality of religion 
and religious ritual suggests that high levels of mutual, observable ritual practice 
create a sense of solidarity, group bonding, trust and willingness to cooperate among 
                                                                   
1  Iannaccone’s (1998) comprehensive survey of the economics of religion also includes a review of 
studies that associate religious observance with beneficial social behavior (e.g., lower rates of crime 
and drug and alcohol abuse), more stable marriages and mental and physical health benefits.  
2  Private rituals appear to serve an alternative purpose, such as convincing oneself that one believes in 
the theology ascribed to the rituals (Rappaport 1999, Sosis 2003).   5
practitioners. Increased cooperation may be observed in a business transaction, a 
collective enterprise such as farming, building a house or providing a public good, or 
day-to-day interactions requiring cooperation.  
Others have also documented economic benefits associated with religious 
observance. Ensminger (1997) argues that the vast number of African societies that 
have converted to Islam can be understood in terms of increased trade o pportunities 
for those who convert. By adopting Islam, Ensminger contends, the African converts 
earned the trust of traders from North Africa and the Middle East, which allowed for 
the extension of credit to expand further trade possibilities. Moreover, Islam provided 
a legal code to adjudicate financial contracts and disputes and a common language of 
trade (Arabic). The high entry costs into Islam in the form of daily prayer, abstinence 
from alcohol and pre-marital sex, fasting during Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to 
Mecca served as signals of trustworthiness among traders. In other words, these 
rituals and taboos are costly signals of commitment that screen out free-riders, 
restricting the benefits of more efficient trade to those who are willing to undertake 
such demanding rituals and prohibitions. 
  Berman (2000) discusses the network of mutual aid established by Ultra-
Orthodox communities in Israel and the government subsidies and draft deferments 
offered to these communities. Access to the economic benefits is restricted by strict 
religious observance, epitomized by an exacting adherence to a spate of costly 
religious prohibitions and rituals. Adherence to these practices serves to signal 
commitment to the community, tax competing secular activities outside of the 
community like work, and screen out opportunistic individuals seeking the diverse 
forms of mutual insurance and charitable activities furnished by the community.  
  The success of Ultra-Orthodox Jews in the diamond industry is another 
example of the economic benefits achieved by close-knit religious communities. 
Shield (2002, p. 104) describes the level of trust among Ultra-Orthodox Jews who 
work in New York’s diamond district is “unheard of.” Indeed, despite the large sums 
of money involved, multi-million dollar transactions are sealed by nothing more than 
Yiddish and a handshake (Shield 2002, p. 2).  Among those who work in the diamond 
industry, trust is essential for business activity since traders are often handling 
valuable stones that could easily be lost or pocketed. Ultra-Orthodox Jews attain this 
high level of trust and mutual cooperation through costly religious demands, such as 
particular dress and hairstyle, restrictions on permitted food, thrice daily prayer,   6
among many others, which are r equired for entry into their community.  This has 
enabled them to out compete others unable to achieve such high levels of cooperation, 
thus resulting in their prominence in the industry throughout the world.  
Nowhere is cooperation more necessary than for communes whose survival 
and success hinge on it. In comparative work on a sample of 200 19
th century U.S. 
communes, Sosis (2000) shows that religious communes are between two and four 
times more likely to survive in every year of their life course than their secular 
counterparts (also see Kanter 1972).  In subsequent work, Sosis and Bressler (2003) 
use historical documents and monographs to construct a database on the requirements 
and constraints that these communes imposed on their members. Their analyses show 
a robust, positive correlation between the costliness of the requirements and 
constraints that communes imposed on their members and communal success. Here 
we examine the impact of ritual performance on the cooperative behavior of an extant 
communal population, the Israeli kibbutz. 
The Israeli kibbutz is among the best known, most enduring and successful 
examples of a modern commune. Kibbutz members live together, typically work and 
socialize together, and share equally all earned income, independent o f an individual 
member’s occupation, skills or work effort. Moreover, the kibbutz pays for individual 
members’ consumption of housing, food, utilities and transportation, among other 
goods. These facts make the kibbutz rife with occasions for free riding a nd 
opportunistic behavior. The imposition of costly, collective religious rituals can serve 
to increase the participant’s sense of commitment to the group, signal this 
commitment to others and increase the participant’s willingness to cooperate with 
other members. At the same time, the screening role ritual plays in Iannaccone’s 
model can also operate in the kibbutz setting: costly rituals can serve as a tax, too 
costly to bear for potential members merely seeking the guaranteed standard of living 
offered by the kibbutz.  
In the next section, we provide some background on the Israeli kibbutz. In 
section 3, we outline the strategy we adopted to select the religious and secular 
kibbutzim that participated in our research. We also detail the experimental game and 
procedures. Section 4 makes explicit the experimental hypotheses we test. The results 
are presented in section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the necessity of frequent costly 
collective rituals, offer an explanation and a mechanism underlying the success o f   7
religious kibbutzim and discuss some implications of our results for religious practice 
in developing countries. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  The Israeli Kibbutz 
 
2.1  Background on the Kibbutz 
 
The kibbutz was originally conceived as a small collective farming settlement in 
which members based their social and cultural lives on the collective ownership of 
property and wealth. The first kibbutz, Degania, was established in the Galilee in 
1909. Today there are approximately 270 kibbutzim located in every region in Israel. 
The 124,000 or so kibbutz members comprise around 2% of the Israeli population. 
The kibbutz developed out of an egalitarian ideology rooted in Socialist-
Zionism as well as the pragmatism of group living by Eastern European Jews during 
the years leading up to the establishment of the modern State of Israel. Guided by the 
dictum “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs,” the 
traditional model of the kibbutz prescribes that each member receives food, shelter, 
clothing, education, health care, and an equal share of the income generated by the 
kibbutz. That all kibbutz members earn an equal income holds whether one is the 
dishwasher in the communal dining hall, the CEO of the computer chip plant, the 
kibbutz gardener, an eye surgeon who works in Tel Aviv or retired. Income earned on 
and off the kibbutz is thus divided equally between all members regardless of 
profession, skill or effort level. In this sense, production or the generation of income 
is a public goods problem. Consumption on the kibbutz, by comparison, represents a 
classic tragedy of the commons problem: kibbutz members enjoy equal and 
unrestricted access to rival consumption goods. For example, in the traditional 
kibbutz, the costs associated with an individual’s consumption of housing, food, 
water, electricity and the use of communal cars are borne by the kibbutz, not the 
individual.  
We design an experimental game that focuses on the common-pool-resource 
aspect of kibbutz consumption. Unlike other common-pool-resource problems, such 
as fishing grounds, groundwater basins, oil fields and grazing areas, for which 
licenses, externally-enforceable agreements restricting access to the resource and the   8
assignment of private-property rights are possible solutions,3 such measures are 
impractical for the kibbutz without drastically altering its fundamental nature. Rather, 
cooperation and voluntary self-restraint are necessary to prevent the depletion of its 
common-pool resources and to ensure the continuity of the kibbutz. 
Indeed, the continuation of the kibbutz should not be regarded as self-evident 
for several reasons. First, the short-lived communal experiments throughout history 
(the American communes of the 18
th and 19
th centuries and the 1960s are among the 
best known examples) attest to the difficulty in sustaining cooperation over time and 
across generations. Moreover, many kibbutzim have shown signs of decline and 
economic hardship in recent years. Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, kibbutzim 
found themselves economically unable to survive by farming alone. Consequently, 
through bank loans, kibbutzim started to diversify their range of economic activities 
by developing manufacturing and service industries. Today, kibbutzim are engaged in 
the production of the entire gamut of goods and services in high technology, 
manufacturing, tourist and agricultural industries using the most modern production 
techniques.  
The decline of many kibbutzim began in the mid-1980s when the Israeli 
economy experienced hyperinflation, s oaring interest rates and a sharp drop in 
exports. Those kibbutzim that took on large amounts of debt in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (at a time when banks began to index loans to the rate of inflation and to 
the dollar exchange rate) were particularly hard hit. Concerns for economic viability 
set in motion numerous structural changes on the kibbutz (see Ben-Rafael 1997 for 
further details). The most significant change adopted by some kibbutzim involved the 
transfer of control of certain resources from the collective to the individual household. 
This process, referred to as “privatization”, consists of numerous measures including: 
the requirement that individual households, rather than the kibbutz, pay for their 
private consumption of goods like travel, electricity, telephone calls and clothing; the 
cancellation of dinner in the communal dining hall thereby requiring kibbutz members 
to eat in their own homes at their own expense; and the encouragement of kibbutz 
members to seek work outside of the kibbutz. However, the most radical change – and 
typically the last one implemented by the small minority of kibbutzim that have 
                                                                   
3  Ostrom (1991) examines the success and failure of such methods through numerous case studies 
involving the collective management of natural resources.  See also Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 
(1994) for a thorough theoretical, experimental and empirical treatment of common-pool resources.    9
decided to implement privatization fully – is differential salaries according to which 
individual kibbutz members earn incomes that reflect, at least in part, their 
productivity.
4   
  Interestingly, religious kibbutzim emerged from the economic crisis of the 
1980s relatively unscathed. For this reason, the banks did not force the religious 
kibbutzim to privatize nor did they choose to adopt such measures. Section 6.2 will 
invoke our findings as a possible explanation of the relative economic success of the 
religious kibbutzim.   
 
2.2  Religious and Secular Kibbutz Distinction 
 
All kibbutzim belong to one of three kibbutz movements. The secular kibbutzim 
belong to either the Kibbutz Ha’Artzi or TAKAM federation,
5 while the 16 religious 
kibbutzim belong to the Religious Kibbutz Federation.
6 The clean distinction between 
religious and secular kibbutzim and the corresponding attitudes toward relig ion of 
their members provide a natural environment for our hypotheses concerning the role 
of religious observance and religious ritual in intra-group cooperation. 
As mentioned in the introduction, secular kibbutzim are well known for their 
antagonistic attitude toward religion. By contrast, members of religious kibbutzim 
practice a form of Judaism known as Modern Orthodoxy. Modern Orthodox Jews 
adhere to traditional Jewish law (halacha), but unlike Ultra-Orthodox Jews they do 
not shun modernity; for instance, they serve in the Israeli military, own televisions 
and read mainstream newspapers. Numerous prohibitions apply equally to men and 
women, most noticeably, kosher dietary laws, modest dress and the forbiddance of 
work on the Sabbath. Religious ritual plays a central and defining role in the lives of 
Modern Orthodox Jews. Yet the injunction to perform collective rituals does not fall 
equally upon men and women. Male ritual requirements are primarily publicly 
oriented, whereas female requirements are generally in the home or private. Indeed, of 
the three main ritual requirements imposed on women, two are private (namely, the 
                                                                   
4  We also conducted this research on a sample of privatized kibbutzim and a matched sample of 
traditional, highly collectivized kibbutzim (see Ruffle and Sosis, in progress). 
5  In 2001, approximately one year after the completion of our experiments, the merger of the Kibbutz 
Ha’Artzi and the TAKAM federations was announced.  
6  There are two Ultra-Orthodox kibbutzim (Hefetz Haim and Sha’alabim) that belong to their own 
movement known as the Workers’ Union of Israel and three kibbutzim associated with the Progressive   10 
laws of family purity such as attending a ritual bath (mikveh) and separating a portion 
of dough when baking bread), and the third is performed in the presence of the family 
only (lighting Sabbath candles). Males, by contrast, are obliged to engage in a variety 
of collective rituals, thrice-daily public prayer in a minyan (a quorum of at least 10 
men) being the most notable among them.  
Our hypothesis that collective rituals promote group commitment and 
cooperative behavior leads us to expect that religious males will exhibit higher levels 
of cooperation than religious females. Moreover, the more frequently a religious male 
partakes in religious ritual, the more cooperatively we expect him to behave. By 
conducting a common-pool resource game that measures kibbutz members’ 
cooperative behavior with one another and by following up the game with a 
questionnaire that elicits individuals’ degrees of participation in ritual performance, 
we will be able to evaluate the role that collective ritual plays in promoting 
cooperation.  
 
3.  Experimental Methodology 
 
3.1  Choice of Sample  
 
To control for between -kibbutz differences unrelated to behavior, a  matched-pairs 
design guided our choice of sample religious and secular kibbutzim: each of the seven 
religious kibbutzim was matched with one or more secular kibbutzim. The latter were 
chosen for their similarity to religious kibbutzim along four measures that may 
potentially affect cooperation. In forming these matched sample pairs, we controlled 
for the kibbutz’s population size, year of establishment, degree of economic success, 
and degree of privatization. Because religious kibbutzim are, on average, 
economically more successful (Fishman and Goldschmidt 1990) and much less 
privatized (i.e., more communal) than secular kibbutzim, our paired secular kibbutzim 
constitute some of the most successful and highly collectivized secular kibbutzim in a 
movement that is otherwise economically struggling and becoming much less 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(Reform) Judaism Movement that belong to the TAKAM. These kibbutzim have been excluded from 
our sample, although they would make interesting case studies.   11 
communal (Leviatan et al. 1998). In total, 558 kibbutz members from 18 kibbutzim 
throughout Israel participated in our research.
7   
  Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of the control variables 
used to construct our samples of religious and secular kibbutzim. The number of 
members (“Kibbutz Size”) and the number of changes adopted by the kibbutz in the 
direction of privatization (out of a possible 23) are identical in the religious and 
secular kibbutz samples. As for the variables “Year of Establishment” and “Economic 
Strength”, the distributions of these variables are not significantly different across the 
religious and secular kibbutzim (the p -values from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric tests are .42 and .54 for the respective variables). Whatever slight 
differences remain between the two samples follow from the impossibility of 
matching these kibbutzim along all four variables simultaneously. When we were 
unable to find a secular kibbutz that was similar to a particular religious kibbutz on all 
four variables, we opted to compromise on the need to match the two kibbutzim on 
the exact year of establishment. Where two or more candidate secular kibbutzim 
differed appreciably only in their degree of economic strength, we chose the more 
successful secular kibbutz, believing that this should favor higher in-group 
cooperation on the secular kibbutz – opposite to our hypothesis thereby making more 
difficult its validation. A fortuitous by-product of controlling for these four variables 
is that we have created two sample populations that are also very similar in terms of a 
number of demographic variables, such as the age composition of the kibbutz, 
educational attainment, and gender ratio (see Table 1).    
 [insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2  Experimental Design 
 
The logistics of our field experiments and the nature of our subject pool raise several 
essential considerations in the choice of an experimental game. For example, assuring 
subject anonymity is of prime importance since kibbutz members live together, and 
work and socialize with one another on a daily basis. For this reason, we chose to 
                                                                   
7  That some of the religious kibbutzim are quite similar with regard to the control variables means that 
we were able to match one secular kibbutz with three different religious kibbutzim and another with 
two religious kibbutzim.     12 
conduct these experiments in the privacy of the individual members’ homes rather 
than in a public space.  
We also require a symmetric game to allow us to compare kibbutz members’ 
choices with one another. As for the particular nature of the experimental game, 
issues of cooperation and self-restraint confront kibbutz members on a daily basis. As 
discussed in section 2.1, almost all consumption goods on a kibbutz are common-pool 
resources in the sense that they are exhaustible and freely accessible to all kibbutz 
members. We therefore sought a game that captures an element of the common-pool 
resource dilemmas familiar to kibbutz members. 
We select a one-shot game for two reasons. First, we want to capture 
participants’ instinctive willingness to cooperate. A kibbutz member’s instinct to 
cooperate is cultivated by his daily interactions with fellow members. Our question of 
interest is not whether one group is able to learn to be more cooperative than another. 
Second, the diversity of the subject pool in terms of education, age and occupation 
means that we have to choose a conceptually simple game  – one that can  be 
understood by all. A one-shot game contributes to this aim.  
  Indeed, simplicity was the overwhelming consideration in our choice of an 
experimental game. For this reason, we settled on the following two-player game. 
There are 100 shekels available in a joint envelope to which each pair member has 
access.
8 Each pair member independently decides how much of the available 100 
shekels to remove from the envelope to keep for himself. If the sum of the amounts of 
money removed exceeds 100 shekels, then both players receive zero and the game is 
over. If the sum of the amounts removed is less than or equal to 100, then each player 
keeps the respective amount that he removed. In addition, whatever money is leftover 
in the envelope is multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two players.
9 
Appendix A contains the instructions. 
                                                                   
8  All of the experiments in this paper were conducted between January and May 2000. At this time, 4 
Israeli shekels equaled approximately $1 US.  
9  We tested three different variations of this experimental game on student subjects  and members of 
three kibbutzim. The most familiar design we tested was a parameterization of the public goods game 
in which there are 100 shekels to be divided and each pair member may claim up to 50 shekels, that is, 
any amount between 0 and 50. The amounts that each player leaves in the envelope are summed 
together, multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two players. Feedback from subjects 
indicated that they found this design (in particular, the summing together of the amounts each player 
leaves in the envelope) difficult to understand. For this reason, we decided on the game presented 
above.     13 
  Note that any pair of amounts that sum to 100 is a Nash equilibrium of this 
game. For any amount,  xj  , that player j removes from the envelope, player i’s best 
response is to remove  100 minus xj. However, the Nash equilibria of this game are 
socially inefficient. That is, the sum of the pairs’ payoffs is higher if together they 
remove less than 100. The socially optimal outcome is achieved when both players 
remove 0.
10     
  The amount a player removes therefore provides a measure of his cooperative 
behavior. For every shekel a player leaves in the envelope, he adds three-quarters of a 
shekel to his opponent’s payoff and three-quarters of a shekel to his own payoff, 
provided their claims sum to less than 100.    
 
3.3  Experimental Procedures 
 
3.3.1  Preliminaries to Conducting the Experiments  
 
Identical procedures were followed in recruiting subjects and conducting the 
experiments on the religious and secular kibbutzim. After receiving permission from 
the kibbutz general secretary, a letter of introduction describing the nature of the 
research, the sources of funding and a request to participate was sent to every 
household on the participating kibbutz. These letters were mailed out to all 
households on the kibbutz about a week before our planned visit. One or two days 
prior to our visit, we telephoned kibbutz members inviting them to participate in the 
research and, for those who agreed, arranged a specific time to meet.    
 
3.3.2  Upon Arrival at the Kibbutz 
 
To facilitate data collection and to minimize the chances that participants who 
completed the experiment could contact others who may be scheduled to participate, 
20 Ben -Gurion University graduate and undergraduate students (who had completed a 
class in experimental economics) were trained and employed. Between 8 and 14 
subjects (i.e., between 4 and 7 pairs) participated simultaneously at any given time.  
                                                                   
10  Our game resembles the Nash demand game (Nash 1953). The difference is that whatever money is 
leftover in our game gets multiplied by 1.5 (rather than disappears) and divided equally between the 
two players. This distinction encourages players to remove less money so that more is available for the 
pair. In the Nash demand game, the Nash equilibria and socially optimal outcomes coincide.   
   14 
Upon arrival at the kibbutz, each experimenter searched for the home of his 
first subject. Once an experimenter found his subject’s home, he called the other 
experimenter by cellular phone to let him know that he had arrived. He waited outside 
until the other experimenter had also found his participant’s home, at which point they 
entered  their respective subjects’ homes simultaneously. This ensured that the paired 
subjects began the experiment at the same time.  
  Upon entering the subject’s home, the experimenter introduced himself and 
requested a quiet place where they could sit undistur bed for the next 30 minutes. Once 
seated, the experimenter conveyed some preliminary details concerning the 
experiment (see the “Introduction” in Appendix A). The subject was then given the 
instruction sheet and told to take his time to read the instructions carefully. Once 
finished, the experimenter read the instructions aloud.   
To ensure full comprehension of the game, two numerical examples were 
performed. In each example, a pair of numbers was randomly drawn from a bag 
containing numerical values between 0 and 100. The numbers were meant to be the 
amounts chosen by two hypothetical participants in the experimental game. Thus, for 
instance, if the numbers 20 and 60 were drawn from the bag, the participant was 
shown step -by-step that the first player would receive 35 shekels and the second 
player would receive 75 shekels, since the 20 shekels left over would increase to 30 
and be split evenly between them. 
After any clarifying questions were answered, a decision was elicited 
regarding the amount the subject wished to remove from the envelope as well as the 
amount the subject believed the other person would remove from the envelope. The 
experimenter of the subject who decided first telephoned the other experimenter by 
cellular phone and informed him that a decision had been reached.
11 The experimenter 
did not convey the amount of the decision in this conversation in order to avoid any 
reaction or facial expression on the part of the second experimenter, which could 
influence the second participant’s decision. F urther, immediately revealing the 
subject’s decision might raise his suspicions that his decision was being conveyed to 
the other subject who could then use this information to make a decision. The second 
experimenter simply thanked the first experimenter  and said goodbye. Thus, the 
second subject was unaware of the nature of the phone call or even who called. After 
                                                                   
11  Cellular phones were used instead of the kibbutz member’s home phone to prevent the subject from 
discovering the identity of his paired partner.   15 
the second subject reached a decision, her experimenter telephoned the first 
experimenter to exchange their decisions. Each experimenter then communicated to 
his subject the other player’s decision, the amount remaining in the envelope, and the 
amount that he will receive after the amount leftover in the envelope (if anything) is 
multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between both players.   
The subject was then asked to complete a short questionnaire (see Appendix 
A). Upon completion of the questionnaire, the subject was paid his earnings from the 
experiment and asked to sign a payment stub confirming receipt of payment. The 
experimenter then left the subject’s home and proceeded to his next scheduled 
subject. At each kibbutz visited we sampled between 24 (at smaller kibbutzim) and 48 
members (at larger ones). 
 
4. Experimental Hypotheses 
 
In light of the background provided on ritual obligations in Judaism and on the 
centrality of cooperation for the kibbutz, we derive three testable hypotheses in the 
context of our experimental game.  
 
1. Religious males are more cooperative than religious females. 
    As already noted, while men and women share many religious responsibilities, 
collective ritual obligations fall disproportionately on males in Judaism. If collective 
rituals indeed promote group commitment and cooperation, then religious males’ 
additional collective rituals (most notably public prayer) lead us to hypothesize that 
religious men will play our experimental game more cooperatively than religious 
women.  
   
2. The more frequently religious males attend synagogue, the more cooperative they 
are. 
  
In the follow-up questionnaire (question 4b), we asked subjects to report the 
frequency with which they visit the synagogue. If synagogue attendance really does 
signal one’s commitment to the community and its values, then we would expect 
those males who most frequently attend to exhibit most abundantly o ne of the 
kibbutz’s fundamental values, cooperation.    16 
 
3. Religious males are more cooperative than secular male and secular female 
kibbutz members. 
  
In the absence of comparably costly communal rituals on secular kibbutzim, 




Result 1:  Religious males are more cooperative toward fellow kibbutz members than 
religious females. 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
Religious males removed on average 29.9 shekels (median=32.0, n=108) 
compared to 33.7 (median=35.0, n=108) for religious females (t=1.68, p=.048, 
df=211, one-tailed test of means, equal variances not assumed). The histograms in 
Figure 1 offer visual support for this result. Closer inspection of the histograms 
reveals that the most striking difference between the two distributions appears in the 
proportions of males and females that claimed amounts between 0 and 9 shekels. 
Twenty-eight of the 216 participants from the religious kibbutzim claimed between 0 
and 9. Among these 28 subjects, 20 were males (?
2=5.66, p=.017, df=1). Moreover, 
22 of these 28 subjects claimed 0, 18 of whom were males (?2=9.63, p=.002, df=1).12  
The presence of 28 observations at 0, the left extreme value of the censored 
decision space,  necessitates the use of Tobit regressions, since OLS estimates are 
biased on censored data. Table 2 reports the estimates from left-censored Tobit 
regressions (heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses). 13 
Regression (1) offers further support for the relative cooperativeness of religious 
                                                                   
12  We can reject the explanation that religious males are better educated, understand the game better 
and thus claim lower amounts. The years of education among religious females (14.0 on average) and 
religious males (13.8 on average) are nearly identical and this variable is not significant in any of the 
Tobit regressions reported below. 
13  We use a one-sided Tobit regression model because there is only one observation in our entire 
database at the right limit value of 100. Thus, the left-censored and double-censored Tobit estimates are 
identical. The decision to claim an amount less than zero (the left limit value) has a n atural 
interpretation: the subject is willing to contribute money from his own pocket to the envelope, which 
means that for each shekel he contributes he gets back only 0.75 NIS and gives his paired partner 0.75 
NIS. Entertaining the possibility of claiming negative amounts leads to an interpretation of the decision 
to remove more than 100: the subject believes his paired partner will put money in the envelope (i.e. 
claim a negative amount) allowing him to remove more than 100.       17 
males: controlling for a number of other explanatory variables, religious male kibbutz 
members claim about five shekels less than their female cohorts. The other highly 
significant variable in this regression is the amount the subject believes his opponent 
will remove from the envelope (“predict”).14 The positive coefficient (p<.001) on the 
“predict” variable suggests that subjects’ behavior is on the whole motivated by 
reciprocity: the more cooperative the subject believe s his opponent is (i.e., the less he 
believes his opponent will remove from the envelope), the more he is willing to 
cooperate, and vice-versa.15 Along these same lines, religious women predict that 
their fellow kibbutz members will remove larger amounts (mean=41.0, median=45.0) 
than those predicted by men (mean=38.6, median=43.0); although the difference is 
not significant, t=1.21, p=.23, df=200, two-tailed.  
The “frackib” variable expresses the fraction of one’s life spent on the kibbutz. 
It is calculated  as the year the experiments were conducted (2000) minus the year the 
member arrived on the kibbutz, divided by the member’s age. The regression 
coefficient of 8.74 suggests that for every additional 10% of one’s life spent on the 
kibbutz, one can be expected to claim 0.87 NIS more from the envelope. Someone 
born on the kibbutz can be expected to remove almost 9 shekels more than a new 
arrival.
16  
 [insert Table 2 here]  
Result 2:  The more frequently religious males attend synagogue, the more 
cooperatively they behave on average toward other kibbutz members in the game; 
whereas, the cooperative behavior of religious females is unrelated to their synagogue 
attendance.    
                                                                   
14  We also tested a host of other potential explanatory variables. Since none of them were significant in 
this or any other regression we conducted on this sample of kibbutzim, we have omitted them from the 
table. These variables include the kibbutz member’s age, years of education, number of children, 
percentage of children living on the kibbutz and the number of kin on the kibbutz. We also tested for 
several kibbutz-level variables such as the number of members, year of establishment, economic 
success, degree of privatization and the number of holidays celebrated communally by the kibbutz. 
None of these variables were significant. 
15  In regression (2), we include a term for the amount predicted squared (“predict
2”) to allow for a non-
linear, and possibly non-monotonic, relationship between the amount predicted and the amount 
removed by the kibbutz member himself. This variable however is not significant in this or any of the 
other regressions performed on religious kibbutz members. We will return to “predict
2” in our 
discussion of the results from the secular kibbutzim.    
16  This same finding (that the larger the fraction of one’s life spent on the kibbutz, the less cooperative 
one behaves toward fellow kibbutz members) was previously noted in Ruffle and Sosis (2003) on a 
different sample of four kibbutzim. See that paper for an in-depth discussion of the role of self-
selection versus socialization in the cooperative behavior of kibbutz members.   18 
The difference in cooperative behavior between religious males and females 
appears to be attributable to the ritual participation of males. The right-hand (darkly 
shaded) bars of Figures 2a and 2b display the mean amounts claimed by religious 
males and females, respectively, as a function of their frequency of synagogue 
attendance. The figures  draw attention to the fact that daily prayer is required of 
Orthodox males, while no such requirement exists for Orthodox females. 68/102 
males who responded indicated daily synagogue attendance. The remaining 34 male 
respondents attend at least weekly (on the Sabbath) plus on holidays. By contrast, 
only five of the 102 female respondents attend synagogue several times a week or 
more.
17 
[insert Figures 2a and 2b here] 
More importantly, the figures point to a negative relation between the 
frequency of synagogue attendance and the amount males removed from the 
envelope. That is, the more frequently religious males participate in synagogue 
services, the more cooperative they are. For example, men who attend synagogue 
daily remove 27.2 shekels compared to men who do not attend daily who claim 33.1 
shekels on average. No such relation appears to exist among females. Table 3 
provides descriptive statistics for the amount claimed as well as other variables, 
according to subpopulation. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
Regressions (3), (4), (5) and (6) in Table 2 lend additional support to the 
positive relation between the cooperative behavior of religious males and their 
synagogue attendance. We replace the “male” dummy variable with two interaction 
dummies, “religious male*daily synagogue” and “religious male*not daily 
synagogue”. The former variable assumes the value of one for religious males who 
attend synagogue daily and zero otherwise. The negative and highly significant 
coefficients ranging from –6.84 to –6.43 in regressions (3), (4) and (5) indicate that 
religious males who attend synagogue daily remove about six and a half shekels less 
than religious females; whereas, the latter variable is not significantly different from 
zero suggesting that religious males who don’t attend synagogue daily are no more 
cooperative than religious females. Regression (6) includes a dummy variable 
“religious female*weekly”, which equals one for religious females who attend 
                                                                   
17  Note that the total number of respondents (204) does not equal 216 due to missing observations.      19 
synagogue at least once a week (i.e., on Sabbath and holidays, several times a week or 
daily) and zero otherwise. The statistically insignificant coefficient reveals that these 
women are no more cooperative than women who attend synagogue less frequently. 
Other regression specifications not included here confirm that female  synagogue 
attendance is unrelated to their cooperative behavior in the game. 
The left-hand (lightly shaded) bars of Figures 2a and 2b display the mean 
amounts that religious male and religious female kibbutz members predicted their 
opponents would remove from the envelope. The data show that the more frequently 
males attend synagogue, the less they believe their opponents will claim in the game. 
Together with the positive relation between cooperative behavior and synagogue 
attendance, this again suggests that the desire to cooperate and to reciprocate motivate 
male kibbutz members who claim small amounts. Among religious females, no 
relation between synagogue attendance and “predict” exists. 
Having examined in depth the cooperative behavior of religious men  and 
women, we turn now to our secular sample.  
 
Result 3:  Secular male and secular female kibbutz members exhibit similar levels of 
cooperation toward fellow kibbutz members.  
 
This result indicates that inherent sex differences cannot account for the 
observed disparity in the way religious males and females play the game. Males from 
secular kibbutzim remove on average 30.1 shekels (median=32.5, n=170), while 
females from secular kibbutzim removed on average 30.5 shekels (median=30.0, 
n=172), t=.21, p=.83, df=327. Furthermore, regressing the amount claimed by secular 
kibbutz members only on a host of explanatory variables, including a dummy variable 
for sex, shows that secular males and secular females claim similar amounts (p=.210 
in (7) and p=.184 in (8) of Table 4). The positive and highly significant coefficient on 
the “predict” variable again suggests that, by and large, secular kibbutz members’ 
decisions are motivated by reciprocity. Yet the inclusion of “predict
2”, the fact that it 
is negative and highly significant and its magnitude imply that the positive relation 
between “predict” and the amount removed from the envelope holds as long as 
“predict” is less than 69.75 shekels. This relationship is consistent with the reciprocity 
motive. For values of “predict” greater than 69.75, on the other hand, an increase in 
the amount predicted accompanies a decrease in the amount removed from the   20 
envelope. This relationship is consistent with the fear of exceeding the available 100 
shekels. In our sample, only 1 5/342 secular kibbutz members predicted that their 
opponents would remove more than 69.75 shekels.   
[insert Table 4 here] 
Recall from the Tobit regressions in Table 2 that this non-monotonic 
relationship between the amount removed from the envelope and the amount 
predicted was not observed among religious kibbutz members. Along similar lines, 
religious males predict the lowest amounts of the four subpopulations (mean=38.56, 
median=45), while secular females predict the highest amounts (mean=43.0, 
median=50). The rank-order, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the 
four subpopulations predict significantly different amounts (?2=6.41, p=.093, df=3). 
The amount a participant believes his opponent will claim can be interpreted as his 
degree of trust in his opponent.
18 By this measure, r eligious males are the most 
trusting (i.e. predict less) of their fellow kibbutz members of any  of the four 
subpopulations. What is more, those religious males who pray daily at the synagogue 
are even more trusting, predicting only 36.12 on average, significantly less than any 
other subgroup (see Table 3 for the details.)  As we will now show, a controlled 
comparison of the amounts claimed reveals that they are also the most cooperative.  
 
Result 4:  Religious male kibbutz members are the most cooperative subpopulation in 
the religious and secular kibbutzim. They remove significantly less money from the 
envelope than secular males, secular females and religious females, controlling for a 
number of explanatory variables.  
   
Inspection of the raw data and summary statistics offers little indication of 
Result 4: at first glance, religious males would appear to behave quite similarly to 
secular males and secular females, with religious females as the outliers, exhibiting 
less cooperative behavior than the other three groups.  
Regression (9) in Table 5 involving all kibbutz members (religious and 
secular) provides a controlled comparison of the cooperative behavior of the four 
subpopulations. Three of the four subpopulations are represented in this regression 
                                                                   
18  Thus, for instance, the religious woman who claimed 100 shekels (see Figure 1) and predicted that 
her opponent would remove 0 is very trusting, but uncooperative in that she chooses to exploit what 
she believes to be her very cooperative opponent.   21 
with dummy variables, with religious males as the base category. The regression 
results show that religious males remove about five shekels less than religious females 
(p=.038). Both the sign and the magnitude of this coefficient on the “religious female” 
variable are reassuring since they confirm Result 1 and match the regression estimate 
in (1) of Table 2. What is new is that religious males remove about 12 shekels less 
than secular males (p=.009) and nine shekels less than secular females (p=.030).
19  
[insert Table 5 here] 
These results control for the amount a kibbutz member believes his opponent 
will remove from the envelope (“predict”), “predict
2” and the fraction of a member’s 
life spent on the kibbutz (“frackib”). This last variable was found to be significant on 
the religious kibbutzim only; thus, an interaction variable composed of “frackib” and 
“religious” only is reported.    
Another significant interaction variable is “work off kibbutz*secular”. This 
dummy variable equals one for secular kibbutz members who work off the kibbutz, 
and zero otherwise. The negative and highly significant coefficient of –6.91 implies 
that secular kibbutz members who work outside the kibbutz claim on average about 
seven shekels less than all other groups. To understand this, note that those 
individuals who work outside the kibbutz are typically professionals and earn salaries 
well above the Israeli average. As kibbutz members they are required to contribute 
these high salaries to the kibbutz. Their choice to remain on the kibbutz rather than 
join mainstream, capitalist society therefore signals their commitment to the kibbutz 
values of egalitarianism, community and cooperation. The significance of this “work 
off kibbutz” variable is limited to the secular kibbutzim: it is not significant in any of 
the three regressions involving religious kibbutz members only (shown in regression 
(5) only), even though the fractions of members who work outside the kibbutz are 
very similar on the religious (23%) and secular (25%) kibbutzim.  
We also asked all participants to indicate the number of meals they eat in the 
communal dining hall  during an average week (question 11 of the Questionnaire in 
Appendix A). The frequency with which a kibbutz member eats in the dining hall 
(rather than in the privacy of his home or outside the kibbutz) may serve as solidarity-
                                                                   
19  Nonetheless, all of these groups play this experimental game more cooperatively than Israeli city 
residents. Using the same experimental game, Ruffle and Sosis (2003) find that city residents remove 
35.63 shekels on average (median=40, n=61), e ven though the sample of city residents chosen is 
similar in age, education and standard of living to the kibbutz sample. However, when kibbutz   22 
promoting ritual signaling the member’s involvement in the kibbutz and commitment 
to its ideals. The distributions of frequencies of eating in the communal dining hall are 
very similar among religious and secular kibbutz members (e.g. religious members eat 
an average of 8.94 meals a week in the dining hall (s  = 5.74) compared to an average 
of 8.51 meals a week for secular members ( s  = 5.48), t=0.84, p=.40, df=425). 
Nonetheless, in the secular kibbutzim only, the frequency with which one eats in the 
dining hall is negatively correlated with the amounts members removed from the 
envelope. The regression coefficient of –.287 in (7) in Table 4 indicates that for every 
additional meal a secular kibbutz member eats in the dining hall, he removes 0.287 
NIS less from the envelope. Returning to regression (9) on all kibbutz members, we 
see that the coefficient on the interaction variable “meals*secular” is negative 
(p=.097). Frequent dining in the dining hall is correlated with cooperation on secular 
kibbutzim only. Those secular kibbutz members most committed to the ideals of the 
kibbutz engage in this ritual most frequently.  
Religious kibbutz members appear to have their own forms of religious 
collective ritual and costly signals. While religious kibbutz members work outside the 
kibbutz and eat in the communal dining h all with the same frequency as their secular 
counterparts, these actions do not convey the same information as they do on secular 
kibbutzim. Because Judaism does not oblige women to attend the synagogue 
regularly, the action ceases to be a community-wide ritual or signal for women, even 
for those who do attend regularly. Likewise, the very rare secular kibbutz member 
who may attend the synagogue infrequently conveys no meaningful message about 
his willingness to cooperate since synagogue attendance is not required in the secular 
community. The point is that for a collective ritual to be meaningful as a signal of 
intention in a particular community, it must be valued by members of that community, 
or by outsiders.20 
Two additional regressions that convey the relative cooperativeness of 
religious kibbutz members in general and observant religious males in particular are 
shown in (10) and (11) of Table 5. Controlling for all of the significant explanatory 
variables explained above, religious kibbutz members take out on average about 7.2 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
members play this game against city residents (outsiders), they behave identically to the city residents 
(average=35.2, median=40, n=61).     
20  That outsiders can attribute meaning to the collective ritual practice of others is exemplified by a 
phenomenon described in Frank (1988): affluent New York City families place advertisements in the   23 
shekels less than secular kibbutz members (regression (10)). Regression (11) shows 
that religious males who attend synagogue daily are the primary source of this 
difference: religious men who attend synagogue daily remove about 6.5 shekels less 
than religious women (the base category). Moreover, pairwise t-tests comparing this 
estimate with those for other subpopulations show that religious males who attend 
synagogue daily remove significantly less than secular males (t=3.25, p=.001) and 




6.1  The Necessity of Frequent Costly Collective Ritual 
 
The question arises, what is it about religious observance or religious ritual that is 
associated with higher levels of cooperation among group participants? Costly 
signaling theory suggests the importance of observable collective rituals. Mere faith 
or belief in God not accompanied by costly actions may be less effective at promoting 
cooperation among fellow believers. Here we have shown the relation between 
frequent costly collective ritual (i.e., regular synagogue attendance) and cooperative 
behavior. Religious females and religious males who attend synagogue less frequently 
are less cooperative than males who attend daily. Research by Orbell e t al. (1992) 
supports the importance of regular ritual in cooperative behavior. They conduct a 
repeated n-person prisoner’s dilemma game on university students in Logan, Utah (a 
largely church-going Mormon population) and Eugene-Springfield, Oregon (a mixed 
population with one of the lowest church attendance rates in the U.S.). Their results 
show that whether a person considers himself to be religious is unrelated to his 
cooperative behavior. However, the frequency of church attendance of the Mormon 
participants in Logan is positively correlated with cooperative behavior, while no 
correlation between cooperation and church attendance was observed among non-
Mormons in Logan and church frequenters in Eugene-Springfield.  
Of course, one need not belong to a religion to engage in costly collective 
rituals. Rituals are characteristic of groups that perform collective tasks, such as sports 
teams, armies, volunteer groups, and fraternities and sororities, the success of which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
newspapers of Salt Lake City for Mormon governesses for their children. Apparently, “persons raised 
in the Mormon tradition are trustworthy to a degree that the average New Yorker is not” (p. 111).    24 
hinge upon group solidarity and cooperation. However, using historical data, Sosis 
and Bressler (2003) show that in a sample of 19
th century U.S. communes, the 
costliness of rituals is a significant predictor of cooperative success among religious 
communes only. They suggest that religious rituals are more effective than secular 
rituals in promoting cooperation because the supernatural beliefs that surround 
religious rituals are not subject to verification or falsification and are therefore more 
stable than the secular beliefs that motivate secular rituals (also see Rappaport 1999, 
Sosis and Alcorta 2003). In the case of secular kibbutzim, communal dining may 
serve as a group-level ritual. Consistent with Sosis and Bressler’s findings, it is only a 
weakly significant predictor of cooperative behavior. Moreover, the costliness of 
communal dining remains in question since the alternative to communal dining is to 
eat at one’s own expense at home or outside the kibbutz.  
What is more, our data show that aside from communal dining, no ritual on the 
secular kibbutzim is as widespread or as frequent as daily synagogue attendance 
among Orthodox men on religious kibbutzim. We asked all participants (question 6 in 
the Questionnaire) to indicate “how many times a month on average [they] participate 
in events o pen to all kibbutz members, such as song and dance evenings, movies, 
kibbutz meetings, sporting events, concerts, plays, lectures, study groups, etc.” 
Secular kibbutz members attend only two communal events a month on average, with 
no significant differences between the sexes (t=1.65, p=.23, df=258). Intuitively, this 
seems too infrequent to promote trust or bonding between individuals in the way that 
daily synagogue attendance does. Indeed, the attendance of communal events by a 
secular kibbutz member is uncorrelated with the amount he or she claims in our 
experimental game (s = -.045, p=.45, n=278). 
 
6.2  The Economic Success of Religious Kibbutzim 
 
Religious kibbutzim have been more economically successful than their secular 
counterparts and this disparity has increased over time. Fishman and Goldschmidt 
(1990) find that the per capita net production of the religious kibbutzim has been 
higher than that of the secular kibbutzim in every decade of their 70-year existence 
(see also Fishman 1983). They construct an economic performance measure and 
estimate that the economic success differential in favor of the religious kibbutzim 
increased consistently over the 1958-1982 period. Moreover, the religious kibbutzim   25 
appear to have emerged relatively unscathed from the economic crises of the 1980s, 
not requiring the government subsidies or debt forgiveness from Israeli banks that 
assisted the economic recovery of the secular kibbutzim. Indeed, the Religious 
Kibbutz Movement claims that “the economic position of the religious kibbutzim is 
sound, and they remain uninvolved in the economic crisis which is affecting so many 
of the settlement sector”.  
Explanations for the economic well being of kibbutzim are undoubtedly multi-
faceted, including sound investment practices, the differential political influence of 
the kibbutz federations and historical circumstances. Fishman (1983) speculates that 
the economic success of the religious kibbutzim is due to low levels of consumption 
stemming from adherence to Jewish religious law, which demands restraint and 
limitations. Consistent with this explanation, religious kibbutz members in our game 
are better able to refrain from consuming the common-pool resource than their secular 
counterparts. What our results offer beyond Fishman is a mechanism by which 
religious kibbutz members achieve mutual cooperation. Not all religious requirements 
are equally effective, rather publicly observable rituals most successfully encourage 
self-control.   
 
6.3  An Application to the Developing World  
 
In the minds of many Westerners, those who engage in religious rituals are primitive 
and superstitious. Such stereotypes follow at least in part from the association of 
religious observance with the poorest communities at home and the poorest countries 
abroad. Those who make this association often mistakenly attribute religious 
observance as the cause of poverty.  
Our results suggest that, certainly in the case of the developing world, it might 
be more accurate to say that religious observance is a sophisticated response to 
underdeveloped legal and economic institutions. Religious  rituals promote 
cooperation. For most Westerners, this benefit alone cannot justify the cost of 
partaking regularly in time-consuming rituals. Hayek (1988) makes the point that 
cooperation requires the mutual pursuit of an agreed upon goal among members of the 
society, whereas capitalism involves individuals “pursuing thousands of different ends 
of their own choosing in collaboration with thousands of persons whom they will 
never know” (p. 113). Individuals in advanced capitalist economies face collective-  26 
action problems irregularly, anonymously (e.g. fund-raising campaigns for public 
goods, like public radio and television stations) and with different individuals each 
time. What is more, the existence of well-defined property rights, enforceable 
contracts and an advanced legal system obviate the need for cooperative, trusting 
behavior. However, these guarantees and substitute institutions for cooperation are 
unavailable in developing countries. Ill-defined property rights and a backlogged, 
bureaucratic and corrupt legal system create favorable conditions for the adoption of 
publicly observable religious rituals as a mechanism to promote group solidarity, trust 
and cooperation and to avoid disputes.  
These religious groups are then able to offer members mutual  insurance and 
(local) public goods like health care, education and defense where the government 
and marketplace fail. For example, Berman (2003) explains the use of extremely 
costly practices by religious militias as a means to exclude free riders from the benefit 
of the club good that they provide to members. 
It follows that multinational corporations and foreign institutions investing in 
the developing world and dependent on collaboration with the indigenous people may 
profit from preserving indigenous ritual practices and the environment in which they 
take place. The well-documented water temple system of Bali represents a case in 
point (see Lansing 1991, for the authoritative study, as well as Wilson 2002, pp. 126-
133). A lake in a volcanic crater on the island as well as the rains that run off of the 
volcano irrigate Bali’s rice fields. The Balinese have developed what has proven to be 
an ingenious cooperative system of aqueducts to supply water in equitable amounts to 
the surrounding farmers. At the heart of this coordinated effort lies an indigenous 
religion that worships, among other deities, Dewi Danu, the goddess of the waters 
emanating from the volcano in whose honor an immense temple stands at the 
volcano’s summit. Smaller temples for worship are  located at every branch of the 
irrigation system and at the fields onto which the aqueducts empty. The wisdom and 
success of the Balinese water temple system became clear when the Asian 
Development Bank imposed a farming alternative on the Balinese in the  1980s. The 
Asian Development Bank concluded in 1988 that,  
The substitution of the ‘high technology and bureaucratic’ solution … proved 
counter-productive and was the major factor behind the yield and cropped 
areas declines experienced between 1982 and 1985 … The cost of the lack of 
appreciation of the merits of the traditional regime has been high. Project   27 
experience highlights the fact that the irrigated rice terraces of Bali form a 
complex artificial ecosystem which has been recognized locally over centuries 
(Lansing 1991, p. 124, from Wilson 2002, p. 130). 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The predominant rational choice theory of religious behavior suggests that costly 
prohibitions serve to screen out less committed members and increase the religious 
participation of r emaining members (Iannaccone 1992). Through this screening 
mechanism, religions are able to overcome free-riding problems associated with the 
collective production of “religious goods”.  
We posit that the benefits of religious ritual extend beyond the production of 
religious goods to include beneficial economic behavior and proceed to estimate this 
economic benefit. The Israeli kibbutz presents a host of opportunities for free riding 
and exploitative behavior. Regularly performed collective religious rituals may 
enhance the participant’s sense of group commitment, solidarity and trust, which 
ultimately translate into increased cooperation toward group members. At the same 
time, these costly rituals may screen out potential members motivated purely by 
economic opportunism. Instead, only those truly committed to the kibbutz ideology of 
cooperation would be willing to undertake the significant collective ritual obligations 
imposed upon men in Orthodox Judaism.  
In this paper, we design a test to determine whether the performance of 
collective religious ritual indeed increases the cooperation of its performers. We take 
advantage of the natural distinction between religious and secular kibbutzim to 
compare the cooperative behavior of their members. Even with the careful controls in 
the choice of sample kibbutzim, we find differences in the levels of cooperation of 
kibbutz members. These differences can be characterized by the regularity of 
collective religious ritual performance. Those who most regularly engage in collective 
religious ritual are the most cooperative. One implication is that religious and secular 
kibbutzim alike might be well advised to adopt costly collective ritual requirements.  
In contradiction to the quote with which we began this paper, religion appears 
to offer a significant advantage in dealing with day-to-day economic problems. For 
individuals in capitalist economies who face collective-action problems irregularly,   28 
anonymously or with different individuals each time and who have economic and 
reputational incentives to ensure a minimal degree of cooperation and legal recourse 
in case these incentives fail, devout religious observance on purely economic grounds 
seems unwarranted. However, for communes whose survival depends on solving 
collective-action problems with the same set of people daily and for individuals in 
developing countries who lack the economic and legal institutions to assure 
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Introduction (read aloud by the experimenter) 
 
We thank you for willingness to participate in this research conducted by Ben-Gurion 
University and the University of Connecticut. The exercise in which you have agreed to 
participate relates to decision-making and requires less than 30 minutes of your time. We 
assure you that during the exercise as well as after its completion and on the short 
questionnaire that follows the exercise, your identity will remain anonymous. The information 
collected by the researcher in your home will be used for research purposes only. Under no 
circumstance will your identity be revealed to anyone or published anywhere.  
This exercise in decision-making will take place in pairs. The person with whom you are 
paired for the purpose of this exercise is another member from your kibbutz. Another 
researcher from our team is currently at the home of this person. Under no circumstance will 
you learn the identity of the person with whom you are paired; nor will s/he learn your 
identity. During the decision-making exercise, you will be asked to make a number of 
decisions. At the end of the exercise, the researcher will pay you an amount of money. The 
precise amount of money to be paid to you will be determined by the decisions you make in 
the exercise as well as the decisions of the anonymous person with whom you have been 
paired. This research is funded by a number of grants from various research foundations.     
 
Participants’ Instructions  




In this exercise, you and the person from your kibbutz with whom you are paired 
have access to the same envelope that contains 100 shekels. You must choose an amount 
of money you wish to remove from the envelope to keep. You may choose any amount 
between 0 shekels and 100 shekels, inclusive. At the same time, the member of your 
kibbutz with whom you are paired for this exercise must decide an amount of money 
(between 0 and 100 shekels inclusive) that he or she wishes to remove from the same 
envelope. After you have decided how much to keep from the envelope, the researcher 
will convey your decision by cellular phone to the other researcher who is presently at the 
home of the person with whom you are paired. You and the person with whom you are 
paired will learn of the other’s decision only after each of you has made your decision.  
If the sum of the amounts you and your paired partner choose to remove from the 
envelope (the total amount removed) exceeds 100 shekels, then  you both receive no 
payment and the exercise ends. If you and the person whom you are paired choose to 
remove from the envelope an amount that together is less than 100 shekels, then you each 
keep the amount you removed from the envelope; in addition, the sum of money left over 
increases by 50% (in other words, is multiplied by 1.5) and is divided equally between 
you and your paired partner. 
This completes the instructions. Before you make a decision in the exercise, the 
researcher in front of you will read aloud the instructions an additional time and answer 
any questions you may have. Also, you will be shown two numerical examples in order to 
illustrate the exercise and to avoid any unintended loss in earnings. 




1.  What is your age? 
 
2.  Where were you born? 1. this kibbutz   2. another kibbutz   3. in Israel  4. country ________ 
 
3.  (If participant was not born on the kibbutz) In what year did you arrive at this kibbutz? 
 
4a. Did you grow up in an observant household?   Yes    No  
 
4b. How frequently do you visit the synagogue? 
    1               2                     3                     4                             5                 6 
never          seldom    primarily on holidays    primarily on Sabbath and on holidays       several times a week          every day 
 
5.  How many years of study have you completed? 
 
6.  How many times a month on average do you participate in events open to all kibbutz members such as song 
and dance evenings, movies, kibbutz meetings, sporting events, concerts, plays, lectures, study groups, etc.? 
 
7.   What is your marital status?   
 
1. Single    2. Married    3. Divorced    4. Widowed    5. Divorced/Remarried    6. Widowed/Remarried 
 
8. How many children do you have and what are the ages of each child? 
           
           
 
8b.   Of your children that have reached the age at which they have had to decide whether to become a 
member of the kibbutz or to leave the kibbutz,  
      how many decided to become kibbutz members? _____ 
      how many have left the kibbutz? _____ 
 
9.  How many people live in your home including yourself?  
 
10.  In how many other households on this kibbutz do you or your spouse have family members?  
 
11.   On average, how many meals a week do you eat in the dining hall? _____ 
 
12.  Where do you currently work?  
What is your position?      
How long have you worked at this position? 




                                                                   
21  The questions below are a subset of the full questionnaire. We have included only those questions 
related to this paper. Questions 4a and 4b were asked of participants on religious kibbutzim only. The 
secular and religious questionnaires were otherwise identical.    32 
 
Figure 1 






















Histograms displaying the distributions of the amounts taken from the envelope (in shekels) by male 





Amounts Claimed and Predicted for Religious Males 
as a function of Synagogue Attendance 
                               

















Bar graphs indicating the mean amount claimed by religious males (left-hand bar) and the 
mean amount religious males believed their paired partner would claim (right-hand bar) as a 
function of the frequency of the religious male’s synagogue attendance. The sample sizes for 
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Figure 2b 
   Amounts Claimed and Predicted for Religious Females 
as a function of Synagogue Attendance
















Bar graphs indicating the mean amount claimed by religious females (left-hand bar) and the 
mean amount religious females believed their paired partner would claim (right-hand bar) as a 
function of the frequency of the religious female’s synagogue attendance. The sample sizes 
for each category of synagogue attendance appear above the bar graphs. 
 
 
Table 1  
Comparison of Religious and Secular Kibbutz Samples 
 
Religious kibbutzim  Secular kibbutzim  Variable 
Mean  Std. Deviation  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Kibbutz size  658.3  185.1  652.8  209.3 









0.74  1.84  0.86 
Number of Privatization 
changes adopted by kibbutz 
2.10  1.56  2.11  1.42 
Age (years)  49.96  18.07  47.32  15.86 
Education (years)  13.89  3.03  14.06  2.64 
Sex     
0=female 
1=male 
0.500  0.500  0.497  0.503 
 
Means and standard deviations for a number of kibbutz-level and demographic variables 
reported separately for the religious and secular kibbutzim in our sample. The “Kibbutz Size” 
variable refers to the number of members on the kibbutz. The “Economic Strength” variable is 
a weighted index constructed by the kibbutz research institute Yad Tabenken. This measure is 
composed of the kibbutz’s assets and level of debt. The “number of Privatization changes 
adopted by kibbutz” variable reflects the degree to which the kibbutz remains a traditional, 
collectivized kibbutz. Each kibbutz received a score between 0 and 23 according to the number 
of changes it had implemented at the time the research was conducted.   34 
Table 2 
Left-Censored Tobit Regressions on Religious Kibbutzim 
 
variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
constant  6.92  -0.94  6.57  -0.97  -1.02  0.24 
   (4.85)  (8.77)  (5.04)  (8.76)  (9.01)  (9.83) 
predict  0.54***  1.16**  0.54***  1.15**  1.14**  1.17** 
   (.123)  (.501)  (.128)  (.496)  (.496)  (.478) 
predict





(.007)  (.007)  (.006) 
male  -5.11**  -5.00** 
   (2.42)  (2.47) 
---  ---  ---  --- 
religious male*  -6.70**  -6.84**  -6.43**  -9.20** 
daily synagogue  
---  --- 
(2.87)  (2.85)  (2.96)  (4.69) 
religious male*  -3.99  -3.24  -2.92  -5.54 
not daily synagogue 
---  --- 
(3.19)  (3.35)  (3.50)  (4.81) 
religious female*  -3.34 
weekly synagogue 
---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
(4.14) 
frackib   8.13*  8.74*  8.86*  9.46*  10.53**  10.87** 
   (5.07)  (5.03)  (5.19)  (5.15)  (5.25)  (5.67) 
work off   -0.50 
kibbutz 




meals  ---  ---  ---  --- 
(.202) 
--- 
n  204  204  198  198  193  193 
adjusted R
2  .192  .203  .203  .214  .210  .211 
The dependent variable is the amount removed from the envelope by the subject (in shekels). 
*** The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
**   The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
*     The coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
 
Left-censored Tobit regression coefficients (heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses) from religious kibbutzim sample only. The amount removed from the envelope is 
regressed on, among other variables, the subject’s estimate of how much his opponent will 
remove (“predict”), “ predict
2  ”, a dummy variable for the subject’s sex, interaction dummies 
between religious males, religious females and the frequency of their synagogue attendance, the 
fraction of one’s life spent on the kibbutz (“frackib”), a dummy variable for whether the 
kibbutz member works outside of the kibbutz (“work off kibbutz”) and the number of meals a 
week the kibbutz member eats in the communal dining hall (“meals”). 
         35 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables by Subpopulation 
 
Religious Kibbutzim  Secular Kibbutzim   
 
variable 
Males who Attend 
Synagogue Daily 
Males who Do Not 
Attend Synagogue Daily 
Females  Males  Females 
amount removed  27.21  33.06  33.71  30.13  30.53 
predict  36.12  42.58  41.0  39.24  43.02 
frackib  .676  .678  .639  .688  .648 
% work off kibbutz  22.7%  25.0%  15.0%  24.1%  25.6% 
meals  10.1  10.3  7.8  9.4  7.7 
age  51.0  54.4  48.1  48.0  46.6 
education  13.4  14.3  14.0  14.1  14.0 
n  68  34  108  170  172 
 
Descriptive statistics for key variables by subpopulation. Means are indicated for the amount removed from the 
envelope, the amount that the subject predicted his opponent would remove, the fraction of one’s life spent on the 
kibbutz (“frackib”), the number of meals per week eaten in the communal dining hall, age, and years of education. 




Left-Censored Tobit Regressions on Secular Kibbutzim 
 
 
The dependent variable is the amount removed from the envelope by the subject (in shekels). 
*** The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
**   The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
*     The coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
 
Left-censored Tobit regression coefficients (heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses) for 
secular kibbutz members only. The amount removed from the envelope is regressed on, among other 
variables, the subject’s estimate of how much his opponent will remove (“predict”), “ predict
2  ”, a dummy 
variable for the subject’s sex, the fraction of one’s life spent on the kibbutz (“frackib”), a dummy variable for 
whether the kibbutz member works outside of the kibbutz (“work off kibbutz”), and the number of meals a 
week the kibbutz member eats in the communal dining hall (“meals”).        
variable   (7)  (8) 
constant  0.92  0.44 
   (3.46)  (4.17) 
predict  1.18***  1.18*** 
   (.143)  (.143) 
predict
2  -.008***  -.008*** 
   (.002)  (.002) 
male  2.38  2.55 
   (1.90)  (.194) 




work off   -6.95***  -7.32*** 
kibbutz  (2.42)  (2.44) 
-.287*  -.282 
meals 
(.176)  (.181) 
N  293  291 
adjusted R
2  .282  .278   36 
Table 5 
Left-Censored Tobit Regressions on all Kibbutzim 
 
variable  (9)  (10)  (11) 
constant  -7.12  3.19  2.57 
   (3.92)  (3.97)  (4.06) 
predict  1.14***  1.14***  1.13*** 
   (.163)  (.165)  (.163) 
predict
2  -.008***  -.008***  -.008*** 
   (.002)  (.002)  (.002) 





religious male*  -6.54** 
daily synagogue  
---  --- 
(2.71) 
religious male*  -3.61 
not daily synagogue 
---  --- 
(3.20) 
frackib*  8.25*  7.27  8.97* 
religious  (4.91)  (4.89)  (5.04) 
work off kibbutz*  -6.91***  -6.87***  -6.91*** 
secular  (2.40)  (2.38)  (2.40) 
meals*  -.291*  -.264  -.292* 
secular  (.175)  (.173)  (.175) 
religious  4.92** 
female  (2.36) 
---  --- 
secular   11.77*** 
male  (4.51) 
---  7.31* 
(3.98) 
secular   9.48** 
female  (4.38) 
---  5.03 
(3.79) 
n  497  497  491 
adjusted R
2  .256  .252  .260 
The dependent variable is the amount removed from the envelope by the subject (in shekels). 
*** The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
**   The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
*     The coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
 
Left-censored Tobit r egression coefficients (heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses) for all (religious and secular) kibbutz members. The amount removed from the 
envelope is regressed on, among other variables, the subject’s estimate of how much his 
opponent will remove (“predict”), “ predict
2  ”, a dummy variable for the subject’s sex, 
interaction variables between religious males and the frequency of their synagogue attendance, 
the fraction of a religious kibbutz member’s life spent on the kibbutz, an interaction dummy 
between secular kibbutz members and whether they work outside of the kibbutz, the number of 
meals a week a secular kibbutz member eats in the communal dining hall. The main effects of 
these last three interaction variables are excluded due to multicollinearity. Categorical variables 
by kibbutz type and sex (“religious female”, “secular male”, “secular female”) are also 
included.    